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Abstract: The paper identifies conditions under which asymmetric equilibria may exist 
when carriers compete in designing their network configurations in a game-theoretical 
framework. Two carriers are assumed here, which are allowed to play three different 
strategies: point-to-point, hub-and-spoke (HS) or multi-hub. We find two main stable 
outcomes, which depend on the size of the internal market. First, when the internal 
markets are small, point-to-point network strategies are played by both carriers, while 
for  a  specific  subset  of  parameters  a  collusive  equilibrium  in  a  hub-and-spoke 
configuration can be derived. Second, when the size of the internal markets is large, 
asymmetric configurations, where one carrier chooses a hub-and-spoke strategy and the 
other chooses a point-to-point strategy, are the only stable equilibria. The result can be 
used  to  describe  the  co-existence  of  alternative  business  models  that  have  recently 
emerged in the aviation industry: the established full-service model based on the hub-
and-spoke system and the recent low-cost model based on the point-to-point system. 
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1. Introduction 
From the mid-1990s to the beginning of the new millennium, the European aviation 
industry faced one of the biggest booms in its history. However, this tendency was not 
confirmed  in  subsequent  years.  At  the  beginning  of  2000,  the  economic  slowdown 
brought an end to the growth phase, and the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and 
the SARS virus in 2003 worsened the situation. In 2004, the airline industry probably 
faced the most difficult period of its existence.  
 
Nevertheless, during these years, a group of airlines were able to generate profits and 
positive growth by generating a cost advantage, no frills, and a point-to-point network 
business model in contrast to the traditional hub-and-spoke national flag carriers. The 
low-cost business model is currently quite popular and is advocated as an alternative 
for the traditional airlines business models which, on the contrary, aim to cover all 
market segments and city-pairs, and therefore these airlines are named ‘full-service 
carriers’ (FSCs).  
 
In  the  past,  low-cost  carriers  (LCCs)  were  considered  a  successful  separate  niche 
market,  characterised  by  passengers  with  low  willingness-to-pay  and  connecting 
secondary  city-pairs.  Nowadays,  the  scenario  is  changed:  FSCs  and  LCCs  often 
compete on the same routes and for coincident segments, while LCCs performance 
indicators are in general higher than those of FSCs. This change of perspective have 
pushed the current debate on the future of the aviation sector toward the investigation 
of  the  coexistence  of  these  two  business  models.  The  ongoing  debate  focuses  on 
whether  the  FSC  business  model,  successful  during  the  1980s  and  1990s,  is  now 
sustainable in a market crowded by LCCs. 
  
The differences between the two business models are multi-faceted (see e.g. Alderighi 
et al. 2004). FSCs have an HS network, while LCCs offer PP connections especially 
from secondary airports. The LCC product is not differentiated as they offer no frills, 
no lounges at airports, no choice of seats, no newspapers, no catering, no frequent flyer 
programme, no refund, and no possibility to rebook to other airlines. The distribution is 
as simple as possible by making use of Internet direct sales and with electronic tickets.    3
Although  previous  characteristics  still  play  an  important  role  to  provide  a  cost 
advantage to LLCs, Franke (2004) found that the most relevant success factors are the 
network configuration and the streamlined production processes. 
 
In this paper we do not compare the FSC business model and the new LCC business 
model in each characteristic, but we address the most important one, i.e., the network 
configuration
2. The analysis is performed from a theoretical point of view. We examine 
a game-theoretical context where carriers are allowed to play three different strategies, 
viz. point-to-point (PP), hub-and-spoke (HS) or multi-hub (MH) and we identify the 
conditions under which a-symmetric equilibriums may exist. We further discuss how 
the outcomes of the model can be used to describe the observed coexistence of different 
business models. 
 
The development of the HS network started quite some time ago in the long history of 
European aviation. Before liberalization, the HS network in Europe developed out of 
the  former  national  flag  carriers  and  took  advantage  of  operating  in  a  regulated 
industry: bilateral agreements, protected markets, and set prices. Indeed, the former 
bilateral regime of air service agreements had already led to the development of hubs. 
In this context, the only available international freedom was what is called the 6th 
freedom, i.e. the right to provide transport services between two countries other than 
the one where the aircraft is registered across the territory of that country. In other 
words,  this  is  the  possibility  to  connect  two  countries  via  the  national  hubs. 
Furthermore,  major  airlines  developed  the  concept  of  ‘network  planning’,  i.e.  the 
process of capacity supply optimization to match the forecasted demand. On the basis 
of this strategy, carriers bundle more and more traffic flows into their hub by feeding 
and de-feeding operations. The airline’s  unit cost  is therefore  reduced, as  grouping 
passengers with the same travel origin but different destinations allows the realization 
of  economies  of  density  on  both  feeder  flights  and  connecting  flights  to  the  final 
destinations.  
 
                                                 
2  In  a  recent  study,  Franke  (2004)  showed  that  LCCs  cost  reductions  come  from  the  streamlined 
production process, which is strongly related to the choice of a PP network configuration. Many of the 
differences between FSC and LCC stem from the choice of the network structure (see below).   4
The objective of the HS network planning is the maximization of the number of city 
pairs to cover all traffic segments (business and leisure). A HS network design focuses 
on the connectivity within hubs which is typically implemented by concentrating the 
flights’ landing and take off time at the hubs (hub waves). The wave design determines 
the outbound and inbound flights connectivity. The disadvantages of the HS strategy 
are:  the  lower  quality  service  to  the  passenger  (who  would  normally  prefer  direct 
flights) and an increase in operational costs for the airline. Indeed, these waves create 
peak times in the hubs and, consequently, congestion with possible delays, including 
missing connections.  
 
The point-to-point (PP) network of an LCC is operated by a simple fleet with a limited 
variety  of  types  of  aircraft  which  are  very  cost-efficient  (Boeing  737  or  Airbus 
320/319). According to Franke (2004), the considerable cost reduction of LCCs comes 
from an intensive use of the aircraft: the aircraft of a LCC is in the air, on average, 
more  hours  a  day  compared  with  the  traditional  carriers.  This  generates  higher 
productivity of aircraft and crew. Moreover, lower maintenance costs, due to simpler 
fleets  and  lower  landing/ground  handling  fees  negotiated  with  secondary  airports 
without congestion problems, cause also relevant differences in the production process. 
In the present paper, the economic feasibility of different connectivity structures (HS, 
PP, MH) will be an analysed for both LCCs and FSCs.  
  
 
2. The model 
We analyse  here  a  simple  symmetric  network
3  which  has four  nodes  (cities).  Two 
nodes are located in a domestic country and two in a foreign one. In the domestic 
                                                 
3 There are a few papers that model airline competition as a network game. Among these, it is worth 
mentioning that of Oum et al. (1995), who present a network game in which carriers investing in hubbing 
make a firm “tough” in the multi-product market competition. The use of HS networks turns out to be a 
device for entry deterrence. Another contribution to the analysis of network competition is given by 
Adler (2001) who studies a two-stage duopoly competition where carriers first choose their hubs, the 
connections to spokes and the frequencies, while afterwards they compete both on direct and indirect 
routes. She finds that there are multiple equilibria as well as no equilibria, depending on the parameters. 
Other papers on the topic include Hansen (1990), who studies hub competition in choosing the level of 
frequencies,  and  Hong  and  Harker  (1992),  who  mainly  analyse  the  competition  for  slot  allocation.   5
country, there is a big city, H, and a small one, S. The big city is a candidate to be a 
Hub in a HS network and the small city is a candidate to be a Spoke. Similarly, we call 
H* and S*, respectively, the big and the small city in the foreign country (see Figure 1). 
The consumer’s demand for flights between the cities depends on the size and distance 
of the towns and the price charged by the carriers. We assume that the reservation price 
in each market is normalized to 1, and that the potential size of each market (given by 
the  number  of  passengers  when  the  price  is  set  equal  to  zero)  is  as  follows: 
l n m h > = >  and  m f d > = . These assumptions are consistent with the predictions of 
gravity models which suggest that traffic flows are proportional to the size of the cities 
and negatively proportional to the distance. The demand is linear, that is, if the price in 
the route r is  r p , the inverse demand is  r r r q p 1 1- = . 
 











On the supply side, we assume that there are 2 carriers: a domestic FSC carrier, and a 
foreign LCC carrier. Each carrier owns 4 planes of size a, and it can choose among 3 
different network structures: 
·  P:  Point-to-Point:  each  carrier  allocates  one  plane  on  the  main  routes 
originating from its country. Carrier 1 covers the routes d, m, n and h, while 
carrier 2 covers f, n, m, and h. 
·  H: Hub-and-Spoke: each carrier allocates two planes on the domestic route and 
the other two planes on the routes originating from the Hub H. The domestic 
carrier covers d (with two planes) and m and h (with one plane each), whilst the 
foreign carrier covers f (with two planes) and n and h (with one plane each). 
                                                                                                                                            
Bhaumik (2002) investigated the welfare implications of carriers’ competition and the role of a regulator. 
Finally, Hendricks et al. (1997) analyse asymmetric duopoly competition where departure time is used as 
a crucial competitive variable.   6
·  M:  Multi  Hub-and-Spoke:  each  carrier  allocates  two  planes  in  the  domestic 
market and two planes to connect the main cities. The domestic carrier covers d 
and h, while the other carrier covers f and h. 
We confine our analyses to these three network structures. We have also tested for 
alternative configurations, but this does not enrich the outcome of the analysis. 
 
To deal with this model we need to make strong assumptions on pricing policies of 
carriers and preferences of passengers. First, we assume that carriers offer all their 
capacity  to  the  market  (i.e.,  planes  fly  full  if  possible).  Hence,  the  price  a  carrier 
receives for its service only depends on market demand, and the carrier does not have a 
monopoly power. We also assume that carriers charge a price for each route separately, 
and they cannot give a discount or charge a premium for connected flights. Here, we 
are not interested in the pricing strategy of the carrier, but only in the network strategy 
of the carrier. We know that a carrier can increase its profits by using more complex 
pricing policies, but the result we obtain must be thought of as a benchmark case.  
 
Secondly, it is assumed that the airfare is the only variable on which consumers base 
their decision. There is neither a frequency premium nor a discount for stops. And 
finally, we assume that carriers have already chosen their network structures, to allocate 
their planes on the network. The issue centers around the question how the market 
determines prices and passenger flows. 
 
3. The pricing rule 
The rule for allocating passenger flows on the network, and consequently obtaining 
prices, rests on the hypothesis of no arbitrage: passengers, who want to fly from one 
city to another, will choose the least-cost combination of routes. As an example, the 
price formation is described when the domestic carrier chooses network P1 and the 
other carrier chooses network P2. First of all, we identify the number of planes on each 
route. There is one plane on route d provided by the domestic carrier and two planes on 
route m, n and h. Note that l is not served directly. We assign the flows to each route 
and the remained freely on the network. For example, passengers belonging to l can be 
assumed to choose d plus n and f plus m. Symmetry allows us to assume that half of 
these passengers will choose the first way of travel and half the second way.   7
To solve the model exercise, we have to assign numerical values to the parameters. We 
assume that the capacity of each plane is  2 3/ a = , and that the dimensions of the routes 
are: 4 = = h d ,  3 = m  and  2 = l . The problem can then be specified:  
 
Demand side: 
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No-arbitrage condition: 
m d l p p p + =  
 
The  following  prices  are  obtained  19
13 = = f d p p ,  4
1 = h p ,  38
29 = l p ,  and 38
3 = = n m p p . 
Now we immediately notice that passengers d and f can choose n plus h and m plus h, 
respectively, and save money. This implies that there is room for arbitrage. To cross out 
the opportunity of arbitrage, the flows d and f can be partially re-routed till the prices 
on the direct and indirect link are the same. Hence, to solve the model we impose the 
condition that the prices of indirect flights are at least as high as the price of the direct 
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No-arbitrage condition: 
h m f h n d m d l p p p p p p p p p + = + = + = , ,  
 
The solution to the new problem is:  82
49 = = f d p p ,  82
34 = h p ,  82
64 = l p , and  82
15 = = n m p p . 
In this case, it is not possible to gain more by changing the routes and, hence these are 
the equilibrium prices. The computation of profit is quite simple, as we assume that all 
seats are taken. Hence the profit is just the sum of the price on each route times the 
capacity offer (number of provided seats times capacity of the plane). Hence the profit   8
of carrier 1 is  067 . 2 164
339 = = × + × + × + × a p a p a p a p n m h d . The same holds for carrier 
2. In general, this solution can also be presented as a linear programming problem 
where total passenger expenditure is minimized subject to demand and supply side 
constraints  and  a  no-arbitrage  condition.  This  fact  is  appealing,  as  the  solution  is 
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       (no arbitrage) 
 
h l n m f d r W V p q r r r r , , , , , , 0 , , , = " ³ .          (positive constraints) 
 
The  problem  has  been  solved  using  the  software  OPL  studio  5.13.  Thanks  to  the 
linearity of constraints and of the objective function, solution prices and quantities are 
unique,  and  consequently  the  profit  of  both  firms  is  unique.  Uniqueness  is  a  very 




4. The equilibrium of the game   9
We assume that each carrier can choose a particular structure independently of the 
choice of its opponent. In total, this may generate 9 possible configurations. Excluding 
the symmetric ones, we finally have 6 possible results. Table 1 summarizes the pay-off 
results of the two carriers when the capacity of each plane is a=3/2, and the size of the 
markets are: d=h=4, m=3 and l=2 (reference case). 
 
Table 1.  Pay-off matrix; reference case 
  P2  H2  M2 
P1  2.067  2.067  2.477  2.087  2.326  1.124 
H1  2.087  2.477  2.085  2.085  2.466  1.380 
M1  1.124  2.326  1.380  2.466  1.846  1.846 
Note: Underlining indicates Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
There appear to be two Nash equilibria: P1-H2 and H1-P2. The pay-offs concerning 
P1-P2 and H1-H2 are both lower than  the pay-offs concerning the  Nash solutions. 
Hence, a  symmetric  PP or a  symmetric HS structure cannot be implemented, even 
under collusion. 
 
To analyse the robustness of the result, the size of the domestic market is changed. If 
we expand the size of the domestic market of the two carriers, i.e. if we replace d=f=4 
with d=f=4.5 or more, we obtain similar results. When the domestic market is small 
d=f=3.5, then the PP solution can be implemented (see Table 2). Note that the payoffs 
in  the  case  of  P1-P2  are  the  same  for  H1-H2,  but  the  HS  equilibrium  can  be 
implemented under collusion. 
 
Table 2. Pay-off matrix with small domestic market 
  P2  H2  M2 
P1  1.964  1.964  2.391  1.884  2.209  1.011 
H1  1.884  2.391  1.974  1.974  2.384  1.331 
M1  1.011  2.209  1.331  2.384  1.787  1.787 
Note: Underlining indicates Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
 Table  3  summarizes  the  pay-off  of  the  two  carriers  when  the  domestic  carrier 
introduces a flight on the route S-S*. The analysis is similar for the foreign carrier. If 
carriers are free to change the network, the equilibrium is (P1+L, P2). That means that 
both carriers move to a PP configuration (reference case). 
 
Table 3. Pay-off matrix after introduction of a connecting service   10
  P2  H2  M2 
P1 - L  2.352  1.773  2.662  1.519  2.637  1.119 
H1 - L  1.894  2.287  2.250  1.875  3.100  1.110 
M1 - L  1.438  2.317  1.760  2.451  2.221  1.846 
Note: Underlining indicates Nash equilibrium. 
 
If the preceding equilibrium is P1-H2, Carrier 1 has no incentive to add a flight, as its 
payoff reduces from 2.477 to 2.352, while it has a small incentive (2.352-2.087), if it is 
in the equilibrium situation H1-P2. Hence, if the costs of buying a new carrier are 
sufficiently high, none of the carriers will decide to invest in a new carrier. Note that if 
we do not permit a carrier to modify its network, but only to add a flight on the route l, 
the carrier choosing HS configuration also has a reduction in pay-off compared with the 
previous equilibrium. 
Figure 2 depicts the different equilibrium strategies obtained by varying the size of the 
domestic and foreign market from 3 to 5. In general, we note that when a carrier’s own 
market is small, the carrier will play a PP strategy and when its own market is large it 
will  play  HS  strategy.  When  the  domestic  market  is  large  for  both  carriers,  an 
asymmetric equilibrium emerges. The symmetric HS strategy is sustainable only under 
collusion, and when the size of both the domestic and the foreign market is small and 
similar. 
 
Figure 2. The solution of the network game depending on the size of d and f. 
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5. Alternative pricing rule 
In the paper we choose to evaluate a firm’s profit as a result of welfare maximization 
which corresponds to the minimal profit it gains, given the network configuration. Real 
profits  are  upper-bounded  by  first-degree  price  discrimination  profits  and  lower-
bounded by consumer surplus maximization profits.  
The choice of the latter indicator is based on the following reasons. First, competition 
may limit the possibility of price discrimination and surplus extraction. Average prices 
on routes where there is competition are, ceteris paribus, lower than on routes where 
there is no competition. 
Second, there are some difficulties in assigning consumers surplus when dealing with 
connecting  passengers.  For  example,  if  an  indirect  flight  is  provided  by  different 
carriers,  each  carrier  would  like  to  extract  all  the  rent  (difference  between  the 
consumer’s willingness to pay and their sum of the competitive prices). Third, even 
when we assume that carriers split the profit evenly, some problems remain. In fact, in 
this linear programming setting, we obtain a unique solution for quantities and prices 
but not for passengers’ flows on indirect routes. Differences in passengers’ flows on 
indirect routes have no impact on profit, when calculated assuming lack of monopoly 
power. However these differences may affect profit returns under first-degree price 
discrimination.  
The model assumes that, in the price setting, carriers have no monopoly power, so that 
they are implicitly consumer surplus maximizers or welfare maximizers rather than 
profit maximizers. We provide a brief argument to reconcile the welfare maximization 
assumption with the profit maximizing behavior. 
To keep things simple, the following example can be considered, where there is only 
one carrier, namely 1, and one market, namely d. Assume that the market size is d=4, 
and  the  capacity  supplied  is  3 2 5 . 1 = × = × d s a .  Welfare  maximization  implies  that 
25 . 0 = d p ,  3 = d q , the profit of the firm is 0.75, and the consumer surplus is 1.125. 
Alternatively,  if  carrier  1  has  all  the  monopoly  power  but  it  cannot  practice  price 
discrimination, it sets  50 . 0 = d p  and  2 = d q , and the profit is 1.00, while the consumer 
surplus is 0.50. In addition to this, consider a case where carrier 1 can practise a first- 
degree price discrimination. In this situation, the firm sets personalized prices for each 
consumer and extracts all the consumer surplus. The first consumer will pay 1.00, the 
second one will pay a little less than 1.00, and the last consumer will pay 0.25. The   12
profit  of  the  firm  is  now  given  by 875 . 1 3 75 . 0 5 . 0 3 25 . 0 = × × + × ,  and  the  consumer 
surplus is nil. It is a well-established result that, under first-degree price discrimination, 
the firm gains the maximum profit and concurrently welfare is maximized. Contrary to 
the first part of this example, the surplus is now given to the firm. Hence, the profit 
maximizing behavior of a firm is consistent with the welfare maximization choice when 
it is assumed that firms will extract all the consumer rent.  
Indeed, revenue management techniques employed by airline companies usually pursue 
this goal. Carriers try to segment customers according to their willingness to pay. They 
charge  higher  fares  to  higher  willingness-to-pay  consumers  and  lower  fares  to  the 
others.  The  market  segmentation  is  quite  sophisticated  as  carriers  charge  about  10 
different fares for each origin-destination. However, this is not a guarantee that they are 
able to extract the entire consumer surplus. 
 
In Table 4 we provide the pay-off matrix computed under the assumption that carriers 
practice price discrimination. We assume that carriers continue to price discriminate 
(even if they are on the same route), that the consumer surplus is split evenly, and that 
flows on indirect flights are symmetric whenever possible.  
 
 
Table 4. Pay-off matrix when firms price-discriminate 
  P2  H2  M2 
P1  3.759  3.759  4.100  3.768  4.066  3.348 
H1  3.768  4.100  3.957  3.957  3.916  3.397 
M1  3.348  4.066  3.397  3.916  3.346  3.346 




Table 4 uses the same values on the market size of Table 1. In this case, as well as in 
the previous one, we observe two asymmetric equilibria.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In the previous section, we have presented a rather simple model with two carriers and 
four cities (two large and two small ones). Carriers are allowed to play three different 
strategies: point-to-point (PP), hub-and-spoke (HS) or multi-hub (MH). We find that 
two main equilibrium outcomes emerge, depending on the size of the internal market. 
First, when the internal markets are small, the PP network strategy is played by both   13
carriers,  and  for  a  specific  subset  of  parameters,  a  collusive  equilibrium  in  a  HS 
configuration can be implemented. Second, when the size of the internal markets is 
large, asymmetric configurations, where one carrier chooses a HS strategy and the other 
chooses a PP strategy, are the only stable equilibria.  
 
The main result of the paper is that there can be a existence between a HS and a PP 
network and this result seems to be quite robust to variations in parameter and pricing 
rules. Before relating the outcome of the model to the current situation in the aviation 
sector, it is worth emphasising that the results are obtained through a rather stylised 
model under stringent assumptions.  
 
The  economic  literature  identifies  two  main  elements  affecting  the  choice  network 
configuration: first, the spatial distribution of demand for direct flights among different 
towns, and second, the overall dimension of the market and the opportunity to exploit 
economies of density. The first factor is related to the choice of the HS network when 
the spatial distribution is uneven and the location of hubs is in large concentrations. The 
second factor concerns the choice of a HS network when the market is small, i.e., when 
the need to exploit the economies of density is stronger.  
 
The driving forces behind our model are the differences in market size for the various 
city-pair combinations. This is an element that seems to have received less attention in 
most models presented in the airline literature. Most theoretical models address the 
problem of a network configuration in terms of economies of scale and density. These 
factors  can  stimulate  HS  networks  in  small  markets  and  a  PP  configuration  when 
markets are large enough. However, our model shows that when the traffic flows to an 
airport are large, i.e. the internal markets are large, the incumbent firm develops its hub 
in this airport and pushes the LCC to operate in smaller ones. Indeed, we observe, at 
least in Europe, that most HS carriers such as Lufthansa or Air France, have already 
developed their hub in large cities (Frankfurt, Munich and Paris). Smaller cities with 
small traffic flows are left to LCC operations.  
 
There is another important but as yet insufficiently addressed aspect, which suggests 
the coexistence of HS and PP in European aviation systems. It is noteworthy that FSC 
carriers are stuck with the HS configuration to sustain the supply of intercontinental   14
flights.  It  still  seems  impossible  to  fill  a  Boeing  777  or  an  Airbus  330  for  an 
intercontinental destination without a HS strategy. A carrier will still need to bundle 
demand from several origins. The feeder system is critical here, not only for charging 
intercontinental flights but also for the intra-European traffic flows. Hence, the choice 
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